1. A parent's right to raise a child is a constitutionally protected liberty interest. This is well-established constitutional law. The U.S. Supreme Court long ago noted that a parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children" is an interest "far more precious" than any property right. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, 97 L. Ed. 1221, 73 S.Ct. 840, 843 (1952). In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 120 S.Ct. 2153, 2159-60 (1981), the Court stressed that the parent-child relationship "is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and absent a powerful countervailing interest protection.'" quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 31 L. Ed 2d 551, 92 S.Ct. 1208 (1972).

2. A state's granting of sole custody is sufficiently intrusive to warrant scrutiny, i.e., granting sole custody to one parent impinges on the rights of the other parent to a significant extent. This is obvious to the most casual observer. A parent whose time with a child has been limited to the typical four-days-per-month visitation clearly has had his or her rights to raise that child severely restricted. In Troxel v. Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999), Justice O'Conner, speaking for the Court stated, "The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.' We have long recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, 'guarantees more than fair process.' The Clause includes a substantive component that 'provides heightened protection against governmental interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interest" and "the liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interest recognized by this Court." Logically, these forms of fundamental violations are inherently a federal question.

3. The compelling state interest in the best interest of the child can be achieved by less restrictive means than sole custody. A quarter-century of research has demonstrated that joint physical custody is as good or better than sole custody in assuring the best interest of the child. As the Supreme Court found in Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993): "’The best interest of the child,' a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings, is a proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to which of two parents will be accorded custody. But it is not traditionally the sole criterion -- much less the sole constitutional criterion -- for other, less narrowly channeled judgments involving children, where their interest conflicts in varying degrees with the interest of others. Even if it were shown, for example, that a particular couple desirous of adopting a child would best provide for the child's welfare, the child would nonetheless not be removed from the custody of its parents so long as they were providing for the child adequately." Narrow tailoring is required when fundamental rights are involved. Thus, the state must show adverse impact upon the child before restricting a parent from the family dynamic or physical custody. It is apparent that the parent-child relationship of a married parent is protected by the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. In 1978, the Supreme Court clearly indicated that only the relationships of those parents who from the time of conception of the child, never establish custody and who fail to support or visit their child(ren) are unprotected by the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). Clearly, divorced parents enjoy the same rights and obligations to their children as if still married. The state through its family law courts, can impair a parent-child relationship through issuance of a limited visitation order, however, it must make a determination that it has a compelling interest in doing so. Trial courts must, as a matter of constitutional law, fashion orders which will maximize the time children spend with each parent unless the court determines that there are compelling justifications for not maximizing time with each parent. Throughout this century, the Supreme Court also has held that the fundamental right to privacy protects citizens against unwarranted governmental intrusion into such intimate family matters as procreation, child-rearing, marriage, and contraceptive choice. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926-927 (1992).

Contrary to the state's consistent disregard for the rights of natural parents to care, custody, control, and management of their natural minor children, the federal Due Process and Equal Protection rights extend to both and all natural parents equally. In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, (1979) the Supreme Court found that a biological father who had for two years, but no longer, lived with his children and their mother was denied equal protection of the law under a New York statute which permitted the mother, but not the father, to veto an adoption. In Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Supreme Court held that "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' Caban, [citations omitted], his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause." (Id. at 261-262). To further underscore the need for courts to consider the constitutional protections which attach in family law matters, one need only look to recent civil rights decisions. In Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 f. 2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987), the court of appeals held that in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 where police had killed a detainee, the children had a cognizable liberty interest under the due process clause. The analysis of the court included a finding that "a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of his or her child." Id. at 1418, citing Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F. 2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985). In Smith the court stated "We now hold that this constitutional interest in familial companionship and society logically extends to protect children from unwarranted state interference with their relationships with their parents." Id. In essence, the Supreme Court has held that a fit parent may not be denied equal legal and physical custody of a minor child without a finding by clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness and substantial harm to the child, when it ruled in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), that "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."

The above are just a very small sampling of the supporting cases to be used in our united attack... there are many more solidly supporting cases and arguments to be included in the final class action complaints...